FRSCA stitches together several CNCF/Sigstore ecosystem tools:
| Component | Role |
|---|---|
| Tekton | Pipeline execution engine |
| Tekton Chains | Captures build metadata and signs it |
| Sigstore (cosign/Rekor) | Keyless signing and transparency logging |
| SPIRE/SPIFFE | Workload identity for build environments |
How Sigstore is Used by FRSCA
Sigstore is the cryptographic backbone of FRSCA, providing keyless signing and transparency logging. It eliminates the need for managing long-lived signing keys.
Sigstore Components in FRSCA
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? FRSCA Pipeline ?
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? ? Tekton ?????? Tekton ?????? Cosign ? ?
? ? (builds) ? ? Chains ? ? (signs) ? ?
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? ? ?
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?
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? Sigstore ? ?
? ? ?
? ??????????? ??????????????????? ?
? ? Fulcio ? ? Rekor ? ?
? ? (CA) ? ? (Transparency ? ?
? ??????????? ? Log) ? ?
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? ? ?
? Short-lived ?
? Certificate ?
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Sigstore Components Explained
| Component | Role in FRSCA |
|---|---|
| Fulcio | Certificate Authority that issues short-lived certificates (valid ~20 minutes) based on OIDC identity |
| Rekor | Immutable transparency log that records all signing events — provides tamper-evident audit trail |
| Cosign | CLI tool that signs container images and attestations using Fulcio certificates |
The Keyless Signing Flow
- Build completes ? Tekton Chains captures build metadata (provenance)
- Identity verification ? FRSCA authenticates to Fulcio using OIDC (workload identity from SPIRE)
- Certificate issuance ? Fulcio issues a short-lived certificate binding the workload identity
- Signing ? Cosign signs the provenance attestation with the ephemeral certificate
- Transparency logging ? Signing event is recorded in Rekor (immutable, publicly auditable)
- Certificate expires ? No long-lived keys to steal or manage
Why Keyless Signing Matters
| Traditional Signing | Sigstore Keyless (FRSCA) |
|---|---|
| Long-lived keys stored somewhere | No persistent keys to steal |
| Key rotation is manual burden | Automatic — certificates expire in minutes |
| Compromised key = all signatures suspect | Compromise window is tiny |
| Key management infrastructure needed | Identity-based (OIDC/SPIFFE) |
Verification Flow
When verifying an artifact signed by FRSCA:
- Check Rekor ? Confirm signing event exists in transparency log
- Verify certificate ? Confirm it was issued by Fulcio at build time
- Validate identity ? Confirm the signer identity matches expected build system
- Check provenance ? Verify attestation content (source, builder, etc.)
# Example: Verify with cosign
cosign verify-attestation \
--type slsaprovenance \
--certificate-identity <builder-identity> \
--certificate-oidc-issuer <oidc-issuer> \
<image>